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One of the many lessons we can learn from C.S. Lewis’s Screwtape Letters is that it 
is through our most noble sentiments that we are most vulnerable to temptation. 
Screwtape’s advice to his nephew is to work on his patient’s good feelings and keep 
them thoroughly abstract to encourage him to pray devoutly for his mother, but to 
forget all about her rheumatism. Similarly, Screwtape warns his nephew not to be 
too optimistic about the hate likely to be generated at the outbreak of war. He 
gloomily remarks that for all the patient’s hate of the Germans at a distance, he will 
be certain to give a cup of tea to the first wounded German airman who turns up at 
the back door. In this case it is the hate which is abstract and the love which is 
concrete, just the opposite of what the devil works for and so often succeeds in 
achieving – love in the abstract, but hate, or at least indifference, in the concrete. 
 
The fact that the first, most tragic, and most fatal temptation which mankind 
succumbed to was not a temptation to be ignorant and mistaken, but, on the contrary, 
to possess knowledge and truth, should warn us that our intellectual life, with our 
love of truth and the search for knowledge, may be the happiest hunting ground for 
the devil. This is all the more lamentable because, since the devil makes his own use 
of our noble sentiments, it is often by appeal to the intellectual apostolate that he 
gets his results. Our university chaplains are only too well aware of that bulk of 
students who show little interest in learning, no signs of ever wanting to read and 
think, but only a keen desire to possess the truth. What such students need is a 
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 meditation on the deadly sin of sloth, which should include a meditation not only on 
their own mental inertia but, in St Thomas’ expression, on their tristitia de bono 
spirituali – their sadness in the face of spiritual good. Instead, they are given the 
truth in pamphlets or in various courses, as though truth came in ready-to-assemble 
kits. Humility and intellectual effort are both enemies of the devil. The smugness 
which comes with this sort of ‘possession of the truth’ extinguishes humility, and, 
while it excuses past laziness, it puts a stop to further thinking. For when such 
students find that their views are criticized and that their immature arguments fail, 
they are more likely to throw the blame on their opponents for persecuting them, 
rather than on themselves for being inadequate. 
 
While there is a great need for a wide survey of this kind of spiritual poverty, I 
should like to turn to one, perhaps one of the worst, of our sins in the intellectual 
field, that of spiritual pride. One is likely to fall into this sin by identifying absolute 
truth with what one personally thinks to be true. Before I do this, however, we 
should consider that opposite virtue of humility, which should follow from the very 
nature of philosophical activity. 
 
It is obvious that the fact that I consider my views to be true does not mean that they 
are true. However, not only is it my obligation to say what I think to be the case, but 
I do not know what else I should or even could say. It may be suggested – 
pointlessly – that I should say what is objectively true and not what I subjectively 
think to be true. The suggestion is pointless because if I thought my views to be true 
merely subjectively, I would not entertain them; it is precisely because I think that 
they are objectively true that I do in fact hold them. It may also be suggested, 
equally unhelpfully, that if there existed a system of philosophy which contained the 
truth and nothing but the truth, then we should teach that system and not the views 
that we personally consider to be true. Since some people think that such a system 
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 does indeed exist, let us consider why this suggestion does not enable us to say 
something other than what each of us considers to be true. 
 
While the study and better and better understanding of such a system can have no 
end, it must begin somewhere. It is an integral part of the understanding of a 
philosophical proposition to see what its implications are, what it amounts to and 
what is the significance of its truth or falsity. Moreover, while philosophical 
problems themselves are permanent they are expressed in an impermanent idiom and 
are phrased in a way that can be understood only in the context of those problems 
with which our philosopher was concerned. No one can understand his predecessors 
without either returning into their intellectual milieu or re-thinking their thoughts in 
our contemporary idioms. It is this never-ending process of understanding, 
interpreting and re-thinking which is called the study of philosophy, and the process 
is the same whether the works of the philosopher we study contain all the truth or 
not. There is no short cut to truth. We cannot first have the truth and then see what it 
amounts to, for if we want to find out how things are, we have to go through this 
process of thinking. And it is not the case that only false philosophers have to be 
studied in this fashion or that only in their case do we ever need to change our minds 
as to what their propositions really amount to. Now each time we change our minds, 
we do so because we realize that our notions were mistaken, and we can realize this 
only in the light of a new and better understanding of the problems involved. But of 
course our belief that our new understanding is a better one is no guarantee that it is 
the right one. Each of our many changes of mind is the same in this respect, that 
each time we change our mind it is because we come to a new understanding, but 
without having any guarantee that this is the last time we shall ever change our 
minds. It must be remembered that the existence of a ‘true philosophy’ is quite 
compatible with none of us actually having the truth, and we cannot just appeal to 
that philosophy to vindicate our views, but have to use our own arguments and our 
own understanding of how things are. 
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Not that anyone who is fascinated by finding out how things are would ever wish 
never to change his mind. Indeed, the occasions when one is compelled to change 
one’s mind after coming to a better understanding of a problem offer some of the 
greatest delights of philosophy. After a time one even looks forward to these 
occasions. In philosophy the difference between a master and a student is not that 
the one has the truth while the other has not, or that the one already knows that x is 
the case while the other still mistakenly thinks that y is. The difference between 
them cannot be determined by reference to which of them has the truth, but by 
seeing which of them is more at home in this never-ending process of understanding 
and re-thinking. For the master cannot look back over his career and point to the 
time before which he was mistaken and after which he had the truth. He would never 
have gone through any of his changes of mind unless he had thought at the time that 
he was changing from a mistaken view to a correct one. A master may, however, be 
able to look back on his life and point to the time when his philosophising taught 
him to respect truth so much that he never again confused the truth with his own or 
with anyone else’s views. 
 
If, on the other hand, we do not believe in objective truth, then, of course, no one 
need ever change his mind, and then what each of us thinks is simply what each of 
us thinks, and there is no point in assuming that anyone could ever be mistaken. In 
that case, the only means of persuasion left for us would be force or threat, 
propaganda or advertisement. But these can never change our minds, only our 
publicly-observable behaviour. Even advertisement and propaganda can change only 
our un-thought-out opinions and not those views for which we have reasons. Force 
or advertisement can make us change our shirts but not our minds. Perhaps this is 
why philosophers who widely disagree with each other speak up with almost one 
voice when an authority suggests to them that they should teach the truth and not 
what they think to be the case. One does not know what else is requested here but to 
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 accept another person’s views without being convinced that they are right, and this 
amounts to abandoning objective for subjective truth. 
 
The virtue that follows from the very nature of philosophical activity is that humility 
which would never allow one to confuse objective or absolute truth with one’s own 
views. The respect we learn is not only for truth, but for other human beings as 
rational beings. The secret of our free will is that we do not simply respond 
automatically to outside stimuli, but with regard to what we think to be the case. If 
we want to treat each other as human beings, then we should change another 
person’s ways by trying to change what he thinks to be the case. This can be done 
only by reasoning, and only in this way can we bring about a responsible human act. 
 
While browsing in the Vatican Museum recently I came across a few pages of St 
Thomas’ manuscripts. It was delightful to see how he crossed out lines and whole 
paragraphs and wrote between the lines and on the margins. The immense hard 
thinking that went into his monumental work is one of the greatest treasures that the 
Catholic Church possesses on the human level. Although the Church naturally does 
not claim that the works of Aquinas contain the truth and nothing but the truth, I 
worked on the assumption that there could be such a system to show that even on 
this extreme assumption not one of us can claim to have the truth. Yet this great 
treasure can at the same time present the greatest temptation to spiritual pride. We 
must be very careful about this because, like other temptations, it appeals to our 
noblest sentiments. Screwtape knows enough psychology to realize that we would 
not listen to him if he asked us to persevere in our own ideas as if they were the 
truth. More probably he would give the following instructions to his nephew: 
 
Make your patient think that he has a higher vocation than to teach what he 
thinks to be the case. His vocation should be to teach the absolute truth. Don’t 
worry if he has pledged himself to humility because you can misuse this virtue 
too. Make him think of himself merely as a humble instrument through which 
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 the absolute truth will speak. If you want to pay attention to details you could 
make him accept, but only on the authority of Aquinas, that argument from 
authority is the weakest argument. He will not suspect that he attributes 
infallibility to himself, because his own humble self disappears from his 
consciousness. Perfection of his mind for him will be only the perfection of an 
instrument, and he will look on other minds, too, as instruments that should 
reproduce truth. What better results could we expect than that rational beings 
should be treated as machines, as we have achieved in communist countries 
where people cannot say what they think to be the case, but are forced to have 
the truth. Do not worry, however, that absolute truth will really speak to the 
world this way. You know very well that truth is not an entity that speaks, for it 
is an attribute of statements, and attributes do not speak. As long as he loves 
truth in the abstract he will neglect to work in the concrete to make statements 
that are true. Just make him slip from ‘I believe in truth’ to ‘I have the truth’ 
and then he will neither have it nor believe in it. 
 
If we put it bluntly like this, the temptation sounds childish. But we must not 
underestimate its force. For it is difficult to grasp that a belief in objective truth 
requires us to have an open mind which is ready to change, and that to be a master is 
not to know certain propositions, but to know what arguments require and what 
others do not require us to change our minds, and, above all, not to let our minds be 
changed by anything else but by arguments. It is similarly difficult to grasp that if 
we believe in the perennial nature of philosophical problems, then we should deal 
with our contemporary philosophical problems in our contemporary idioms. For if 
our problems are perennial, these problems cannot possibly be new. Only if we 
assume that problems can go out of date and yet for some curious reason the old 
problems are more relevant to our lives than the new ones, can we shut our minds to 
contemporary philosophy. 
 
Contemporary philosophy is more concerned with teaching the methods of finding 
out how things are rather than actually telling us how things are. Many people find 
this irritating; many think it futile or trivial; but what I have been trying to say is that 
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if we paid more attention to the methods of attaining the truth, we might benefit not 
only intellectually but spiritually. 
 
